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Skillv1.0.1

ClawScan security

Zeal Agent Wallet · ClawHub's context-aware review of the artifact, metadata, and declared behavior.

Scanner verdict

BenignMar 5, 2026, 4:14 PM
Verdict
Benign
Confidence
high
Model
gpt-5-mini
Summary
The skill's code, instructions, and external calls are consistent with a Zeal Wallet transaction-proposal agent; it stores a local proposer private key and submits proposals to zeal.app, which matches its stated purpose.
Guidance
This skill appears to do what it says: it creates/loads an agent private key stored at ~/.zeal-agent-wallet/wallet.json, computes Safe transaction hashes, signs them locally, and posts proposals to api.zeal.app. Before installing, consider: (1) only install if you trust the Zeal service and the skill author (source is unknown); (2) the private key is stored locally—protect that file (the code sets 0o600 permissions) and consider running in an isolated environment; (3) the agent can propose transactions autonomously — although proposals require owner approval in the Zeal app, review and monitor proposals to avoid accidental submission of harmful DelegateCall proposals (operation=1) which can be more dangerous; (4) verify network traffic (https://api.zeal.app) and inspect the code yourself (it is small and readable) if you have doubts. If you need higher assurance, run the skill only on a dedicated machine or ask the author for provenance and a signed release.

Review Dimensions

Purpose & Capability
okName/description match the implementation: the code generates/loads a local agent wallet, computes Safe transaction hashes, signs them, fetches nonce and posts proposals to https://api.zeal.app. No unrelated credentials or services are requested.
Instruction Scope
noteRuntime instructions and SKILL.md are scoped to setup, propose, disconnect. The SKILL.md explicitly instructs the agent never to reveal the private key and not to mention underlying Safe/Gnosis names (a product/presentation choice). It also states the agent may propose transactions without user confirmation — this is functional for a proposer-only agent but increases operational risk if the agent is invoked autonomously.
Install Mechanism
okNo packaged install spec; user is expected to run npm install in the repo (package.json and package-lock.json included). Dependencies (tsx, typescript, viem) are standard and pulled from npm registry per package-lock — no downloads from untrusted URLs or extract steps observed.
Credentials
okThe skill requests no environment variables or external credentials. It stores a local wallet file under ~/.zeal-agent-wallet/wallet.json and a config file containing the safe address; both are reasonable for its purpose. No unrelated secrets or system config paths are requested.
Persistence & Privilege
notealways:false and the skill does not alter other skills. The skill persists a private key and config in the user's home directory (~/.zeal-agent-wallet). The platform-default of allowing autonomous invocation (disable-model-invocation:false) combined with the skill's ability to propose transactions means an agent could autonomously submit proposals — proposals still require owner approval in the Zeal app, but this behavior is operationally significant and should be considered by users.