Counterclaw Core
Analysis
The core scanner appears defensive, but the optional Gmail sender can fail open and send email without protection if the scanner is unavailable.
Findings (3)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.
if not COUNTERCLAW_AVAILABLE:
return {"safe": True, "pii_detected": None, "scanned": False}When the scanner cannot be imported, outbound content is treated as safe and unscanned instead of blocking. In the bundled email-sending flow, this can allow a supposedly protected email to proceed without PII scanning.
Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.
gog login your-email@gmail.com ... export GOG_ACCOUNT=your-email@gmail.com export GOG_KEYRING_PASSWORD=your-keyring-password
The optional email integration uses a Gmail account through the gog CLI and references a keyring password environment variable. This is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but it grants real email-sending authority.
Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.
MEMORY_PATH = MEMORY_DIR / "MEMORY.md"
...
f.write(f"**Sample:** {safe_text[:100]}...\n")The middleware writes samples of blocked inputs or PII-detected outputs into OpenClaw's memory file. PII is masked and the sample is bounded, but untrusted prompt text can still become persistent agent memory.
