Threat Radar
Analysis
Threat Radar is broadly aligned with security monitoring, but it overstates its CVE-feed coverage and asks for broad local, network, and persistent monitoring authority that users should review carefully.
Findings (7)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.
# Mock NVD data (in production, parse actual NVD API) ... cve_data["github"] = {}SKILL.md advertises automatic NVD and GitHub Advisory feeds and large CVE database counts, but the included fetch routine writes only a small hard-coded NVD sample and an empty GitHub dataset. That can make scan results look more authoritative than they are.
threat-radar scan --docker ... scan --deps <path> ... scan --ports ... scan --openclaw ... scan --exposed
The skill exposes broad local and network scanning functions. This is expected for a security posture scanner, but it can enumerate Docker images, dependency manifests, ports, OpenClaw configuration, and exposed services.
threat-radar cron-install # Set up scheduled daily scans + CVE checks
The skill supports recurring scheduled scans. This is consistent with continuous monitoring and appears user-directed, but it means the scanner can keep running after the initial setup.
Source: unknown; Homepage: none; No install spec — this is an instruction-only skill.
The artifacts provide limited provenance and no clear installation mechanism for a tool that performs broad security monitoring. This is not proof of malicious behavior, but it lowers supply-chain confidence.
Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.
subprocess.run(["docker", "images", "--format", "{{.Repository}}:{{.Tag}} {{.ID}}"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)The code enumerates local Docker images through the Docker CLI. This is purpose-aligned and read-only in the shown snippet, but Docker access can represent elevated local authority and exposes image inventory.
Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.
self.db_file = self.config_dir / "threat-radar.db" ... self.history_file = self.config_dir / "history.jsonl" ... package TEXT, version TEXT
The scanner persists scan data, CVE findings, package names, versions, watches, logs, and history under the OpenClaw workspace. This supports reporting but creates a local inventory of potentially sensitive security posture data.
Alerts you via WhatsApp/Telegram/Discord when new vulnerabilities affect your stack.
Alerting through third-party messaging channels can transmit vulnerability and environment details outside the local workspace. This is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but the artifacts do not clearly define destination, token handling, or data-minimization boundaries.
