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v1.0.7

Futu Trading Bot

SuspiciousClawScan verdict for this skill. Analyzed Apr 30, 2026, 11:59 AM.

Analysis

This appears to be a real Futu trading helper, but it can unlock accounts and place real trades without clearly declared credentials, confirmation gates, or safety limits.

GuidanceInstall or use this only if you are comfortable giving an agent access to your Futu trading environment. Keep credentials private, start in SIMULATE mode, pin dependencies, and require explicit confirmation for every real order or strategy.

Findings (9)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

Abnormal behavior control

Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.

Agent Goal Hijack
SeverityLowConfidenceHighStatusNote
SKILL.md
When the user expresses any of these intents, you should use the encapsulated functions provided in this skill ... Never call Futu SDK functions directly – always go through the skill's API.

This explicitly steers agent tool selection toward the skill for broad trading-related intents. It is disclosed and safety-oriented, but it affects how the agent chooses tools.

User impactThe agent may route many trading-related requests into this skill automatically rather than using other methods.
RecommendationKeep this wrapper-only instruction, but add explicit user-confirmation requirements before any real trading action.
Tool Misuse and Exploitation
SeverityHighConfidenceHighStatusConcern
docs/trade.md
`submit_order(...)`; `modify_order(...)`; `cancel_order(...)`; `cancel_all_orders(...)` ... `REAL` 环境会尝试真实交易,请先确认交易权限状态。

The skill exposes tools that can place, modify, and cancel broker orders, including real-money trading. The artifacts do not define a required approval gate, maximum order size, loss limit, or rollback boundary.

User impactA mistaken or overbroad agent action could place or cancel real orders in the user's brokerage account.
RecommendationRequire explicit confirmation for every REAL trade, enforce account/order limits, and default to SIMULATE unless the user clearly opts into real trading.
Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusConcern
pyproject.toml
dependencies = [ "futu-api", "pydantic>=2,<3", ]

The broker SDK dependency is unpinned, and the registry source/homepage are absent. For a real-trading skill, changing dependency versions can materially change behavior.

User impactA future dependency version could alter trading behavior or introduce unsafe code during installation.
RecommendationPin dependency versions, publish provenance/source links, and document tested versions of futu-api and pydantic.
Cascading Failures
SeverityHighConfidenceHighStatusConcern
docs/trade.md
设计原则 ... 不做幂等去重校验。

The trade service explicitly does not de-duplicate requests. In a trading workflow or long-running strategy, repeated agent calls can create duplicate or cascading financial actions.

User impactA repeated instruction, retry, or strategy bug could place multiple orders or cancel more orders than intended.
RecommendationAdd idempotency keys, duplicate-order checks, strategy-level rate limits, and maximum exposure limits before enabling real trading.
Human-Agent Trust Exploitation
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusConcern
README.md
it accurately translates vague intents—such as "buy 200 shares of Tencent" or "close half of my positions"—into execution actions that comply with financial standards.

This strong assurance could make users over-trust natural-language trading execution, while the artifacts do not show formal financial compliance controls or mandatory confirmations.

User impactUsers may assume the agent safely interprets vague trading requests even when financial consequences are significant.
RecommendationTone down unsupported assurance claims and require the agent to restate exact order details for user approval before execution.
Rogue Agents
SeverityLowConfidenceHighStatusNote
docs/strategy.md
`run_strategy(...)` 职责只包括:PID 文件管理; 防重复启动; `SIGINT` / `SIGTERM` 清理; 保持进程运行

The skill supports long-running strategies with PID management. This is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but it can continue operating until stopped.

User impactA started strategy may keep running and reacting to market data after the initial request.
RecommendationProvide clear start/stop commands, confirm before starting real-trading strategies, and verify cleanup callbacks are registered.
Permission boundary

Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.

Identity and Privilege Abuse
SeverityHighConfidenceHighStatusConcern
metadata / SKILL.md
metadata: `Primary credential: none`; SKILL.md: `Configure credentials` and `Edit json/config.json with your Futu credentials`.

The registry declares no primary credential, but the skill asks for Futu credentials and supports trading-password unlock. That under-declares sensitive account authority.

User impactUsers may install the skill without realizing it needs brokerage credentials and can unlock trading privileges.
RecommendationDeclare the Futu trading credential requirement in metadata and clearly separate quote-only, simulated-trading, and real-trading permission modes.
Sensitive data protection

Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.

Memory and Context Poisoning
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusNote
docs/config.md
`json/config.json` 不应入库,需加入 `.gitignore`。使用最小权限:`chmod 600 json/config.json`。不在日志中输出真实密码或 MD5 值。

The skill persists and reuses local configuration containing trading credentials and broker connection settings. The docs warn about protection, so this is disclosed, but it is sensitive persistent state.

User impactIf the config file is exposed or modified, future agent runs could use leaked credentials or wrong broker settings.
RecommendationKeep config files private, restrict file permissions, avoid sharing the skill folder, and verify config values before real trading.
Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
SeverityLowConfidenceHighStatusNote
json/config_example.json
"host": "127.0.0.1", "port": 11111, "security_firm": "FUTUSECURITIES"

The skill communicates with a configured Futu OpenD brokerage gateway. The default is localhost, which is purpose-aligned, but users can change the endpoint and should trust it.

User impactBrokerage data and trade commands will flow to the configured OpenD endpoint.
RecommendationUse a trusted local OpenD instance and avoid pointing the config at unknown or shared hosts.