Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
Study Buddy - 牛宝华版
v1.0.0AI助手帮助备考日语N2和软考架构师，支持智能出题、自动判分、错题记录和个性化学习计划。
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MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
high confidencePurpose & Capability
Stated purpose (N2 +软考 quiz, scoring, wrong‑answer book) legitimately requires a backend data store like Feishu Bitable; however the package hardcodes a BITABLE_APP_TOKEN and BITABLE_TABLE_ID in both SKILL.md and src/index.js rather than declaring them as required credentials or asking the operator to provide them. Hardcoding the token is unnecessary for the feature and gives the token owner access to data created/read by the skill.
Instruction Scope
Runtime instructions and code keep scope to quiz/plan/progress functionality and only call Feishu Bitable APIs (via global.feishu_bitable_*). That is expected. However SKILL.md and code instruct the skill to record wrong answers and progress into Bitable; because a concrete app token is embedded, user answers and user IDs will be sent to the third‑party Bitable under that token. The SKILL.md suggests setting env vars but the code already uses hardcoded values — an inconsistency and potential misconfiguration/vector for data being stored under the author's account.
Install Mechanism
No external install script or suspicious downloads — this is code bundled with the skill and uses OpenClaw's runtime/global tools. No remote archives or arbitrary binary installs were found.
Credentials
The only external credential needed for the feature is a Bitable app token, which is proportionate. But instead of requiring the operator to supply their own token, the skill includes a hardcoded token and table ID in SKILL.md and code. That gives the token owner access to read/write the skill's data (questions, answers, user identifiers) and means user data may flow to an external account the operator does not control.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill does not request always:true or other elevated platform privileges; it uses in‑memory session caches and calls remote Bitable APIs. The notable persistence/privilege concern is external: data written to the remote Bitable will persist under whoever controls the embedded token. The skill does not modify other skills or global agent settings.
What to consider before installing
This skill appears to implement the advertised quiz and tracking features, but it embeds a Feishu/Bitable app token and table ID in its documentation and code. That means answers, wrong‑question records, and possibly user identifiers will be read/written to a remote Bitable owned by whoever controls that token — not necessarily you. Before installing or using:
- Treat the included BITABLE_APP_TOKEN as sensitive: verify who owns it. If you don't control it, assume your users' data will be sent to that third party.
- Prefer replacing the hardcoded token/table ID with your own Bitable app token (or configure the skill to require operator-supplied credentials) so data is stored under your account.
- Inspect or run the code in a safe/test environment first; confirm which fields/IDs the skill sends.
- If you cannot supply your own token, consider not installing or restrict the skill to non‑sensitive test accounts.
If you want, I can point to exactly where in the files to change the CONFIG to use your token and how to verify what data will be written to the Bitable table.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.