Home Assistant

Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk

Overview

This Home Assistant skill is purpose-aligned, but it can give an agent broad control over smart-home devices and automations without clear scoping or confirmation safeguards.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the agent control over your Home Assistant instance. Use a dedicated restricted token if possible, secure the config file, require confirmation for critical devices or automations, and be cautious with the generic 'call any service' command.

Static analysis

No static analysis findings were reported for this release.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

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ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
High
What this means

A mistaken or compromised agent action could invoke any Home Assistant service the token allows, including scripts, automations, garage/cover controls, thermostat changes, or other physical-device actions.

Why it was flagged

The wrapper implements an arbitrary Home Assistant service caller using agent/user-provided domain, service, and JSON data, rather than limiting actions to a safer scoped set.

Skill content
call) ... domain="${1:?Usage: ha.sh call <domain> <service> [json_data]}" ... api -X POST "$HA_URL/api/services/$domain/$service" -d "$data"
Recommendation

Use an allow-list of safe entities and services, require explicit user confirmation for high-impact actions such as locks, garage doors, alarms, climate, and automations, and disable or restrict the generic service-call command unless truly needed.

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ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
Medium
What this means

Anyone who can read or use the token may be able to act as the Home Assistant account and control or inspect configured entities.

Why it was flagged

The skill expects a persistent Home Assistant bearer token. This is expected for the integration, but it is sensitive account authority and is not declared as a primary credential in the registry metadata.

Skill content
"token": "your-long-lived-access-token" ... export HA_TOKEN="your-long-lived-access-token"
Recommendation

Create a dedicated Home Assistant account/token with the least privileges available, store the config file with restrictive permissions, rotate the token if exposed, and make the credential requirement explicit before installation.

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ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
Low
What this means

If the webhook URL or secret is exposed, outside events could potentially trigger notifications or other agent actions.

Why it was flagged

The skill describes inbound webhook events that may trigger agent behavior. The example includes a bearer secret, but the artifacts do not show validation logic or limits on what webhook-triggered actions can do.

Skill content
url: "https://your-clawdbot-url/webhook/home-assistant" ... Authorization: "Bearer {{ webhook_secret }}" ... Clawdbot receives the webhook and can notify you or take action based on the event.
Recommendation

Use HTTPS, a unique high-entropy webhook secret, validate the Authorization header on receipt, and restrict webhook-triggered flows to low-risk actions unless the user approves escalation.