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v1.0.2

Html To Image

ReviewClawScan verdict for this skill. Analyzed Apr 30, 2026, 5:02 PM.

Analysis

This skill is suspicious because it asks the agent to install and run an unpinned CLI, authenticate through Membrane, and make broad credentialed API/proxy calls with limited safeguards.

GuidanceOnly install this skill if you are comfortable using Membrane as an authenticated proxy for HTML-to-Image requests. Verify the service domain, require approval before any CLI install or mutating API call, use a least-privileged account, and revoke the Membrane connection when finished.

Findings (9)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

Abnormal behavior control

Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.

Agent Goal Hijack
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
`clientAction.agentInstructions` (optional) — instructions for the AI agent on how to proceed programmatically.

The skill tells the agent to consume instructions returned by the connection service, without limiting those instructions to the user's original request or treating them as untrusted.

User impactA remote connection response could influence what the agent does during setup or API use.
RecommendationTreat returned agent instructions as advisory only, and require user confirmation before following any instruction that changes tools, credentials, scope, or performs destructive actions.
Tool Misuse and Exploitation
SeverityHighConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
`membrane request CONNECTION_ID /path/to/endpoint` ... `HTTP method (GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE)` ... `injects the correct authentication headers`

The skill exposes broad authenticated proxy requests with user-controlled paths and mutating HTTP methods, without clear approval, scope, or rollback limits.

User impactA mistaken or malicious request could use the user's connected account to change or delete remote service data.
RecommendationOnly allow read-only or explicitly requested actions by default; require confirmation for POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, and any non-documented endpoint.
Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
`npm install -g @membranehq/cli@latest`; `Official docs: https://htmlcsstoimage.com/docs`; `membrane connection ensure "https://htmlcsstoimg.com/" --json`

The skill depends on an unpinned global npm install and also shows a connection URL that differs from the official docs domain, creating provenance and dependency ambiguity.

User impactThe user may install different CLI code over time or connect to an unintended service domain.
RecommendationPin the CLI version in an install spec, verify the package source, and confirm the correct HTML-to-Image domain before authenticating.
Unexpected Code Execution
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
Install the Membrane CLI so you can run `membrane` from the terminal: `npm install -g @membranehq/cli@latest`

The runtime instructions ask the user or agent to execute a global package installation even though the registry describes the skill as instruction-only with no install spec.

User impactThe skill can modify the local environment and run third-party package code outside the normal declared install process.
RecommendationRequire explicit user approval before installing or running the CLI, and prefer a pinned, reviewed installation path.
Cascading Failures
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
`membrane action run <actionId> --connectionId=CONNECTION_ID --input '{"key": "value"}' --json` and proxy methods include `POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE`

A single wrong action id, input payload, endpoint path, or method can propagate into authenticated remote API activity, with no containment or rollback guidance.

User impactAn error in one command could create, modify, or delete remote resources in the connected account.
RecommendationPreview action names and inputs before running them, and require confirmation for any mutating or irreversible API operation.
Human-Agent Trust Exploitation
SeverityLowConfidenceHighStatusNote
SKILL.md
`Membrane handles authentication and credentials refresh automatically — so you can focus on the integration logic rather than auth plumbing.`

The wording frames credential handling as convenience; it is not deceptive by itself, but users should recognize that delegated credentials and refresh are significant security decisions.

User impactA user may underestimate the importance of granting and maintaining authenticated access.
RecommendationBefore logging in, review what account is being connected, what permissions are granted, and how to revoke access.
Permission boundary

Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.

Identity and Privilege Abuse
SeverityHighConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
`Requires network access and a valid Membrane account` ... `Membrane handles authentication and credentials refresh automatically` ... `injects the correct authentication headers`

The skill relies on delegated account access, automatic credential refresh, and credential injection into proxied requests, but does not clearly bound the scope or lifetime of that authority.

User impactInstalling or using the skill can grant continuing authenticated access through Membrane to act on the user's connected service.
RecommendationReview the Membrane connection permissions, use the least-privileged account possible, and revoke the connection when it is no longer needed.
Sensitive data protection

Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.

Memory and Context Poisoning
SeverityLowConfidenceHighStatusNote
SKILL.md
`Each result includes id, name, description, inputSchema ...` and `clientAction.agentInstructions`

The skill places externally returned descriptions, schemas, and agent instructions into the agent's working context; this is purpose-aligned but should not be treated as higher authority than the user's request.

User impactReturned service text could influence the agent's next steps if the agent over-trusts it.
RecommendationTreat remote descriptions and agent instructions as data, not as system-level instructions, and ignore any content unrelated to the user's task.
Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusNote
SKILL.md
When the available actions don't cover your use case, you can send requests directly to the HTML to Image API through Membrane's proxy ... `injects the correct authentication headers`

The integration routes requests and credentials through Membrane as a gateway/proxy. This is disclosed and aligned with the Membrane integration model, but it is sensitive.

User impactHTML/CSS content, URLs, request bodies, and authentication context may pass through Membrane-managed infrastructure.
RecommendationAvoid sending secrets or private HTML unless the user accepts Membrane's role as a proxy and the connected service's data handling.