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Skillv0.1.0

ClawScan security

Aegis Shield · ClawHub's context-aware review of the artifact, metadata, and declared behavior.

Scanner verdict

SuspiciousFeb 12, 2026, 9:45 AM
Verdict
suspicious
Confidence
medium
Model
gpt-5-mini
Summary
The skill's purpose (scan and safely append memory) is plausible, but the provided script depends on a missing local library and will write untrusted text (including original content) into the agent workspace — these inconsistencies merit caution before installing.
Guidance
This skill is conceptually coherent (it intends to scan and safely append memory), but exercise caution: the bundled script requires a local library at /home/openclaw/.openclaw/workspace/aegis-shield/dist/index.js that is not included or built by the package — the tool may fail or behave differently depending on what that library contains. The script will write accepted entries and full original quarantined text into the agent's workspace (memory/quarantine markdown files), so any secrets or sensitive data in input would be persisted unless you manually filter them beforehand. Before installing or running: (1) verify or inspect the required dist/index.js module that the script loads (or provide a trusted implementation), (2) confirm you are comfortable with files being written to /home/openclaw/.openclaw/workspace/memory, and (3) test on non-sensitive data first. If you cannot review the missing local library, treat the package as untrusted.

Review Dimensions

Purpose & Capability
noteName/description (prompt-injection/data-exfiltration scanning + safe memory append) aligns with the included script's behavior: it scans, lints, sanitizes, and appends/quarantines to the agent workspace. However the script requires a separate local library at a hardcoded path (/home/openclaw/.openclaw/workspace/aegis-shield/dist/index.js) that is not included nor built by an install step, which makes the capability incomplete/unreliable as packaged.
Instruction Scope
concernSKILL.md instructs using the bundled script to scan and safely append to memory. The script does exactly that, but it (a) hardcodes and requires a local module outside the bundle, (b) writes directly into the agent's workspace memory and a quarantine file, and (c) when quarantining it stores the full original text verbatim in a quarantine markdown file (which could contain secrets). This contradicts the skill's own rule 'Never store secrets/tokens/keys in memory' and is a scope creep risk if inputs include secrets.
Install Mechanism
noteThere is no install spec (instruction-only), which is low-risk. However the included script depends on a prebuilt local library at a specific workspace path that isn't supplied or built by the skill bundle; absence of an install step to produce that library is an operational incoherence (the tool may fail to run).
Credentials
okThe skill requests no environment variables or credentials (proportionate). It does read/write files under /home/openclaw/.openclaw/workspace (the agent's workspace/memory), which is expected for a memory-append tool but worth noting since those are sensitive files.
Persistence & Privilege
okThe skill is not always-enabled and is user-invocable (normal). It writes to the agent's memory directory (its intended function) but does not request global persistent privileges or modify other skills' configs.