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v0.1.1

Agentype

SuspiciousClawScan verdict for this skill. Analyzed Apr 30, 2026, 5:59 PM.

Analysis

Agentype has a clear local AI-usage analytics purpose, but it asks the agent to install or run an unpinned external CLI and scan sensitive local agent histories without matching capability or install declarations.

GuidanceBefore installing or invoking Agentype, verify the external agentype-cli package and version, make sure you are comfortable scanning local AI-agent histories, and review the generated JSON/PNG before sharing or leaving them on disk.

Findings (8)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

Abnormal behavior control

Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.

Tool Misuse and Exploitation
SeverityLowConfidenceHighStatusNote
SKILL.md
Run `agentype --json-out` ... Read `output/agentype.json`.

The skill directs the agent to run a local command and consume its generated file output. This is aligned with the analytics purpose, but users should notice that tool execution and local file reads/writes are part of the workflow.

User impactThe agent may run a local CLI and create or read output files when the skill is invoked.
RecommendationOnly invoke the skill when you intend to let it scan local AI usage data, and review the generated output before sharing it.
Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
SeverityHighConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
pipx install agentype-cli
agentype

The skill relies on an unpinned external CLI package even though the registry states there is no install spec and no code files are present. That creates a provenance and package-substitution risk outside the reviewed artifact.

User impactInstalling or running the referenced CLI could execute code that was not included in this skill review.
RecommendationVerify the package source, maintainer, version, and integrity before installation; prefer a pinned, reviewed install specification.
Unexpected Code Execution
SeverityHighConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
`uv run agentype --json-out` ... `pipx install agentype-cli`

Although the submitted skill has no code files, its instructions cause the agent or user to execute external Python CLI code through uv or pipx. The executable code is not part of the reviewed artifact.

User impactRunning the skill may execute third-party code on the local machine and let that code read local agent-history files.
RecommendationDo not run the command until the CLI source and version are verified; use an isolated environment if possible.
Cascading Failures
SeverityLowConfidenceHighStatusNote
SKILL.md
Attach `output/agentype.png` when the environment supports files or images.

The workflow can turn local analysis into a shareable PNG and attach it in chat or IM environments. This is part of the stated purpose, but it can propagate sensitive aggregate usage details beyond the local scan.

User impactA generated image may disclose your top projects, agents, models, or usage patterns if shared.
RecommendationPreview the PNG and summary before attaching or sending them.
Human-Agent Trust Exploitation
SeverityLowConfidenceMediumStatusNote
SKILL.md
"Agentype is fully local in this skill workflow" ... "Using your own LLM when needed"

The local-only wording may be easy to overread because persona inference is explicitly delegated to the invoking agent/model, even though the CLI itself is described as making no LLM calls by default.

User impactUsers may assume the entire analysis never enters model context, while the workflow asks the agent to use its own LLM for persona generation.
RecommendationClarify to users that the CLI collection is local, but persona inference may be handled by the invoking agent/model.
Permission boundary

Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.

Identity and Privilege Abuse
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
Agentype collects local session and token metadata from supported agents where available: Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, pi-agent, Gemini CLI, OpenClaw, Nanobot

The skill uses the current local file permissions to inspect multiple AI-agent history stores. This is sensitive local authority, and the registry artifacts declare no required config paths, credentials, or capability tags to bound that access.

User impactThe skill can analyze metadata from several local AI-tool histories, which may reveal projects, tools, models, or workflow habits.
RecommendationRun it only in accounts/workspaces where scanning those histories is acceptable, and consider limiting custom roots to directories you are comfortable analyzing.
Sensitive data protection

Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.

Memory and Context Poisoning
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusNote
SKILL.md
`--json-out`: writes `output/agentype.json` with the full analysis.

The skill persists a derived analysis of local agent history and then asks the agent to read and modify it. This is purpose-aligned, but the file may contain sensitive project, model, usage, or persona signals.

User impactA generated JSON file may preserve details about your AI usage after the command finishes.
RecommendationReview or delete output/agentype.json after use if the usage summary should not remain on disk.
Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
SeverityLowConfidenceMediumStatusNote
SKILL.md
Using your own LLM when needed, infer a persona from the aggregate signals

The workflow passes aggregate local-usage signals into the invoking agent/model for persona inference. This is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but the artifact does not further define model/provider data boundaries.

User impactAggregate usage details may enter the agent's model context while generating the persona.
RecommendationAvoid invoking persona inference on data you do not want included in the agent context, and check your agent/provider privacy settings.