FHE-as-a-Service
Analysis
This skill asks agents to send clinical values to a remote API while making strong privacy and compliance claims that are not supported by its own usage examples.
Findings (3)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.
"The server never sees plaintext patient data" ... "curl -X POST https://rheumascore.xyz/fhe/v1/compute/das28" ... "-d '{"values": [10, 5, 40, 60]}'"The artifact makes strong privacy claims, but its own compute example sends raw-looking clinical values to the remote service with no documented client-side encryption step.
Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.
"Response includes your `api_key`" ... "Authorization: Bearer fhe_<your_key>"
The skill expects agents to obtain and use a bearer API key, while the registry metadata declares no primary credential or required environment variables.
Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.
"Base URL: `https://rheumascore.xyz/fhe/v1`" ... "Compute a Score (FHE-encrypted)" ... "-d '{"values": [10, 5, 40, 60]}'"The skill routes clinical-score inputs to an external provider API, but the documented data boundary does not clearly show that the transmitted values are ciphertext rather than sensitive patient measurements.
