Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
academic-paper-citation
v1.0.0学术论文引用自动化处理工具。用于处理中文学术论文(特别是硕士/博士论文)的引用管理工作,包括从Word文档提取内容并转换为Markdown、自动识别和提取参考文献列表、在论文正文中智能插入引用标记、将处理后的Markdown转换回Word格式、扩充论文字数以满足字数要求。适用于需要批量处理引用格式、整理参考文献、...
⭐ 0· 53·0 current·0 all-time
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
high confidencePurpose & Capability
The name/description align with the included scripts: docx↔md conversion, reference extraction, inserting citation markers, generating abstracts, and expanding text. Node/npm and python requirements mentioned in SKILL.md match the code. One oddity: the skill is labeled 'instruction-only' but ships a large code bundle — not necessarily malicious but worth noting.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md instructs running scripts with CLI arguments, but many scripts do not actually accept arguments and instead open hardcoded absolute paths under /Users/openclaw2026/.qclaw/workspace/... (read/write). That gives the skill implicit permission to read and overwrite files in that specific user workspace without the explicit filename the user supplied — a scope mismatch and privacy risk.
Install Mechanism
No automated install spec; SKILL.md asks the user to run `npm install docx`. Installing the docx npm package is reasonable for generating .docx files. No downloads from untrusted URLs or archive extraction detected.
Credentials
The skill declares no env vars or credentials, which is appropriate. However, many scripts use absolute filesystem paths to a specific user's workspace and to files like task_status.json, references.json, and output folders. This grants the skill broad local file access (read/write) in that location despite no explicit env/permission model, which is disproportionate relative to a typical citation helper.
Persistence & Privilege
always is false and the skill does not request permanent platform-level privileges. It does write generated files into the user's workspace (its own outputs), which is expected for a document-processing tool. It does not modify other skills or system-wide agent settings.
Scan Findings in Context
[pre-scan-none] expected: Static pre-scan reported no injection signals. That is not evidence of safety—the main concern here is hardcoded absolute paths and file I/O visible in the source files, not obfuscated or networked payloads.
What to consider before installing
This skill appears to implement the advertised features, but inspect and test it carefully before using on real work:
- Don’t run these scripts as-is on your primary files. Many scripts have hardcoded absolute paths (/Users/openclaw2026/.qclaw/workspace/...) and will read/write those locations rather than honor CLI args — this can overwrite data unexpectedly.
- Review and modify code to accept and respect explicit input/output arguments (or run in a disposable environment). Replace hardcoded paths with relative paths or explicit parameters.
- Backup any documents in the referenced workspace before running the skill. Check for files like task_status.json, references.json that the scripts will read — they may contain project metadata.
- Run the tool in a sandbox/container or throwaway VM first so you can observe file reads/writes without exposing your real workspace.
- The only external install requested is the npm 'docx' package — verify you trust that dependency and install it in an isolated Node environment (nvm, project-local node_modules), not system-wide.
- If you plan to allow autonomous invocation, be cautious: although the skill does not exfiltrate data over the network, autonomous runs could read/write many local files due to hardcoded paths. Consider disabling autonomous invocation until you remediate the path-handling issues.
If you want, I can:
- point out all places in the code that use hardcoded paths so you can patch them,
- create a checklist of minimal safe changes to make the scripts accept arguments and avoid surprise file writes,
- or suggest a safe wrapper to run the skill in a temporary directory.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
