Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected

ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.

Vfs

v1.2.0

Provides a multi-agent shared AI virtual memory system with semantic search, token-aware recall, lifecycle management, decentralized discovery, and memory co...

0· 60·0 current·0 all-time
byYuzhe Shi@bkmashiro
MIT-0
Download zip
LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
VirusTotalVirusTotal
Benign
View report →
OpenClawOpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidence
Purpose & Capability
Name/description, the CLI examples, and the many Python modules (avm/*) align with a local multi-agent virtual memory system. However the SKILL.md and README instruct users to run `pip install -e .` and optional FUSE/boto3 installs while the registry record lists no install spec or required env vars; that mismatch (packaged code requiring native and Python dependencies but no declared install steps) is inconsistent. The code also implements optional cloud sync (S3 via boto3) and provider integrations (e.g., Alpaca provider) that reasonably belong to a memory system, but they require credentials and libraries that are not declared in the skill metadata.
!
Instruction Scope
The runtime instructions direct agents to start gossip, subscribe/publish digests, and use the tell/hook system. The project explicitly implements a Hook System that can execute shell commands on incoming 'tell' messages and POST to arbitrary HTTP webhooks; hooks are configurable via virtual filesystem paths (e.g., /hooks/<agent>). That gives any agent or actor who can write those hook files the ability to run shell commands or exfiltrate data to external endpoints. The SKILL.md also recommends auto-running recall on agent startup and scheduling consolidation—legitimate but broad. Overall the instruction set grants powerful actions (shell exec, outbound HTTP) that go beyond simple read/write/recall and must be locked down.
!
Install Mechanism
Registry shows "No install spec — instruction-only skill" while the SKILL.md/README provide explicit install instructions (pip install -e ., fuse requirements, optional boto3). The bundle contains 80+ source files (so it's not purely 'instruction-only') that require nontrivial Python dependencies and optional native components (FUSE, FAISS, sentence-transformers). The lack of a declared, reproducible install mechanism in the registry is a mismatch and increases risk: the code may be executed without clear dependency installation steps or sandboxing.
!
Credentials
The skill metadata declares no required environment variables, yet the code contains features that typically need credentials or keys: S3 sync via boto3, an Alpaca provider, and an API key manager referenced in changelog. The Hook system can POST arbitrary data to webhooks (network egress). Requiring no env vars while shipping code with credential-using features is an inconsistency: either those features should be gated and documented or the skill should declare the environment variables it may access when enabled.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill is not set to always:true and default autonomous invocation is allowed (standard). On its own that's normal. However the combination of autonomous invocation plus writable hook configurations and a shell-execution hook type increases blast radius: if the agent can be triggered or if an attacker can send a 'tell' or write hooks, remote code execution or data exfiltration becomes possible. The skill doesn't appear to modify other skills' configs, but it does offer mechanisms (hooks, webhooks, 'OpenClaw hooks') that integrate with host tooling and should be restricted.
Scan Findings in Context
[system-prompt-override] unexpected: The pre-scan flagged a 'system-prompt-override' pattern inside the SKILL.md. The visible SKILL.md content is mostly API/CLI docs, but the presence of this pattern suggests either prompt-injection content or metadata attempting to change an agent/system prompt. This is not expected for a memory/VFS README and should be inspected in the full SKILL.md for any instructions that attempt to change system prompts or control agent behavior beyond normal API usage.
What to consider before installing
What to consider before installing: - Don’t install this into a production agent without review. The package implements a hook system that can execute shell commands and POST memory/tells to arbitrary HTTP endpoints—if hooks are writable by untrusted agents, secrets or sensitive memories could be exfiltrated or code executed. - Ask the maintainer for a proper install spec and a list of optional features. The registry entry shows no install script but the README requires pip, FUSE, and optional libraries (boto3, faiss, sentence-transformers). Clarify which dependencies are mandatory, and whether any post-install services/daemons run. - Audit hooks and hook configuration before use. If you test the skill, search the code for HookManager/HookConfig and disable or sandbox the shell and HTTP hook types, or restrict who can write /hooks/* and /memory/tell/*. - Run in an isolated sandbox/VM or container first. Because the project can run native FUSE mounts and call external services, test in a throwaway environment and with network access blocked until you’ve confirmed safe defaults. - Review provider integrations (Alpaca, S3) and API key handling. If you enable S3 sync or third-party providers, provide minimal-scoped credentials in a controlled environment and prefer read-only policies where possible. - Inspect the full SKILL.md for the prompt-injection pattern flagged by the scanner. If it contains instructions to change system prompts or automatically inject messages into agent outputs, those are high-risk behaviors. - Consider operational mitigations: restrict which agents can create hooks, disable automatic 'urgent' injection features, and audit sends to external webhooks. If you lack the ability to harden those controls, do not install. If you want, I can: 1) scan the hook-related files (tell.py, handlers for hooks) and summarize exact code paths that perform shell exec/HTTP POST; 2) list all places that perform network I/O or spawn subprocesses so you can decide which features to disable.
!
docs/AGENT-ADOPTION.md:100
Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.
About static analysis
These patterns were detected by automated regex scanning. They may be normal for skills that integrate with external APIs. Check the VirusTotal and OpenClaw results above for context-aware analysis.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

latestvk973aamkddcpx24n7qbhfewsx983e6d7

License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

Comments