Niri IPC
Analysis
This is a coherent Niri control skill, but it gives an agent broad desktop IPC control, including raw destructive actions and shell-backed command spawning.
Findings (4)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.
This script can trigger destructive actions (quit compositor, power off monitors, etc.) if you send those requests. Use with care.
The direct socket helper intentionally exposes raw Niri IPC; the artifact itself states that some requests can cause destructive compositor actions, and no allowlist or confirmation gate is shown.
./skills/niri-ipc/scripts/niri.py action spawn-sh -- 'notify-send hello'
The documented workflow allows shell-backed command spawning through Niri. The example is harmless, but the same pathway can run arbitrary shell text if invoked differently.
Required binaries (all must exist): none ... Required env vars: none
The registry metadata does not declare prerequisites even though the skill documentation and scripts require Niri and NIRI_SOCKET. This is a transparency gap rather than evidence of hidden behavior.
Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.
p = os.environ.get("NIRI_SOCKET") ... s.connect(socket_path())The helper connects to the local Niri IPC socket from the current session, so actions run with the user's existing compositor/session authority.
