Expanso log-sanitize
Analysis
The core log redaction is coherent, but review is recommended because MCP mode opens an unauthenticated all-interface HTTP listener for sensitive logs and the docs include an optional remote cloud deployment path.
Findings (2)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.
- Expanso Edge installed (`expanso-edge` binary in PATH); Install via: `clawhub install expanso-edge`; expanso-cli job deploy https://skills.expanso.io/log-sanitize/pipeline-cli.yaml
The skill depends on an external runtime and documents an optional cloud deployment from a remote URL, while the registry declares no required binaries or install spec. This is aligned with the Expanso pipeline purpose, but the runtime and remote pipeline provenance should be checked.
Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.
http.enabled: true; address: 0.0.0.0:${PORT:-8080}; http_server path: /sanitize; allowed_verbs: [POST]The MCP/HTTP sanitizer binds to all network interfaces and exposes a POST endpoint, while the artifact does not show authentication or a localhost-only default. Because the expected inputs are sensitive logs, this broadens the data boundary.
