Tts
Analysis
This appears to be a straightforward text-to-speech helper that uses external TTS APIs and API keys in a disclosed, purpose-aligned way.
Findings (3)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.
"dependencies": { "openai": "^4.0.0", "commander": "^11.0.0" }The helper relies on external npm packages, while the registry says there is no install spec. The package-lock is present, so this is mainly a setup/provenance note rather than a concrete unsafe behavior.
Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.
- **Keys**: Stored in environment as `HUME_API_KEY` and `HUME_SECRET_KEY`... `OPENAI_API_KEY="..." node {baseDir}/scripts/generate_speech.js`The skill asks for third-party provider credentials. That is expected for Hume/OpenAI TTS, but the registry metadata declares no env vars or primary credential, and users should treat these keys as sensitive.
Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.
await fetch('https://api.hume.ai/v0/tts', { ... body: JSON.stringify({ utterances: [ { text: options.text, voice: { id: options.voice } } ] }) })The helper sends the requested text to Hume’s external TTS API. This matches the skill’s purpose, but it means message content leaves the local environment.
