Skill Auditor

Mandatory security audit for **every** Agent Skill that is newly added, installed, imported, updated, or written. Scope of inspection: the full bundle — SKILL.md, every script next to it (.sh / .py / .js, etc.), and any bundled resource files. Audit dimensions cover skill integrity, prompt injection, data exfiltration, persistence, cross-skill writes, undeclared remote downloads, hardcoded credentials, and more. ===== MUST BE TRIGGERED WHENEVER ===== * The user **adds / creates / installs / imports / updates / writes** any single Skill. * A skill is pulled into the agent's skills directory from ClawdHub, GitHub, a URL, or a local folder. * **Every** newly introduced or modified skill must be audited **individually** — when N skills are added at once, emit a complete report + the §7 final Chinese verdict line for each skill separately. Sampling, merging, or single-summary output is not allowed. ===== Triggering keywords (natural language, Chinese or English) ===== add skill, install skill, create skill, creating a new skill, write a skill, scaffold a skill, new skill, register skill, import skill, update skill, modify skill, bring in skill, hook up skill, audit skill, scan skill, check skill safety, analyze skill, inspect skill, verify skill, skill security, skill supply chain, 这个 skill 安全吗, skill 安全扫描, 检查 skill 安全, 新增 skill, 添加 skill, 安装 skill, 创建 skill, 引入 skill, 更新 skill, 写一个 skill, 接入 skill。 ===== Do NOT trigger for ===== * General system health checks, project debugging, or normal development work that does not touch any skill file.

Skill Audit — Evaluation Core (Classification + Severity)

This file defines the audit evaluation logic. The classification layer answers what it is; the severity layer answers how bad it is. The two are orthogonal and interact only through three interface fields (C_base / required_dims / dataflow_role).

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Language Detection Rule — EXECUTE BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE

Detect the language of the user's triggering message and lock the output language for the entire run. This detection is an internal step only — do NOT output any text that reveals the detection result, such as "当前输出语言为中文", "Detected language: English", or similar meta-statements. Simply use the detected language silently for all subsequent output.

User message language	Output language
Chinese	Chinese — entire output in Chinese
English	English — entire output in English
Other language	Match that language
Cannot determine	Default to Chinese

All intermediate output — scan start prompt, table headers, labels, prose, finding records, and reasoning — must be written exclusively in the detected language. The single final-line verdict in §7 is always Chinese, regardless of detected language. Do NOT mix languages in intermediate output and do NOT announce the language choice at any point.

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1. Classification Layer (Taxonomy)

Each finding is tagged with a triple (Surface, Behavior, IntentMarker). IntentMarker does not participate in scoring; it only affects presentation.

1.1 Surface

Code	Meaning
EXE	Code / shell / subprocess / dynamic eval execution
FS	Local filesystem read / write / delete / chmod
NET	Network inbound / outbound / DNS / sockets
CRED	Environment variables / keys / tokens / credential stores
PROC	Process management, persistence, autostart, scheduled tasks
LLM	Prompt manipulation, tool-description poisoning, jailbreak payloads
AGT	Cross-skill / cross-tool / MCP supply-chain behavior

1.2 Behavior Node Table

Each node declares C_base ∈ {1..4}, required dimensions, and data-flow role (source / transform / sink / none). The data-flow role feeds chain amplification in §2.4.

EXE

Behavior	C_base	Required	Data-flow
EXE.StaticShell — shell with fully constant arguments	2	R, B	transform
EXE.DynamicShell — variable interpolation / shell=True + external input	4	R, I, B	sink
EXE.EvalCode — eval / exec / Function() on strings	4	R, I, B	sink
EXE.RemoteFetch — curl | sh / download-then-exec / fetch-and-run	4	I, B	sink
EXE.Subprocess — constrained subprocess (whitelisted commands)	2	R	transform

FS

Behavior	C_base	Required	Data-flow
FS.ReadPublic — read public files (README, declared paths)	1	—	none
FS.ReadWorkspace — read files inside the workspace	2	R	source
FS.ReadSensitive — read sensitive paths (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, Keychain, browser cookies, .env)	4	I, R	source
FS.ReadOutOfScope — read user files outside declared scope	3	I, B	source
FS.WriteScoped — write inside declared directories	1	—	none
FS.WriteOutOfScope — write outside declared scope	3	I, B	sink
FS.WriteStartup — write startup hooks / shell rc / autostart / launchd	4	R, I	sink
FS.DeleteBroad — wide deletion / rm -rf / wildcard delete / find ... -delete	4	R, I, B	sink
FS.ChmodDangerous — chmod 777 / privilege widen / SUID bit	3	R, I	transform

NET

Behavior	C_base	Required	Data-flow
NET.OutboundDeclared — outbound to a host declared in SKILL.md	1	—	sink
NET.OutboundUndeclared — outbound to an undeclared host	3	I, B	sink
NET.OutboundUntrustedSink — outbound to an Untrusted-Sink indicator (see §5.1.1)	4	B	sink
NET.OutboundObfuscated — obfuscated destination (concat, encoding, homograph)	4	I, B	sink
NET.DnsExfil — DNS TXT with suspicious payload (long subdomain, base64)	4	I, B	sink
NET.InboundListen — local listening port / reverse shell endpoint	4	R, I	sink
NET.Websocket — long-lived / bidirectional channel	2	I	transform

CRED

Behavior	C_base	Required	Data-flow
CRED.ReadEnv — broad read of os.environ / process.env	3	I, B	source
CRED.ReadNamedEnv — read a single declared environment variable	1	—	source
CRED.ReadKeychain — read Keychain / Credential Manager / libsecret	4	I, B	source
CRED.ReadBrowserStore — read browser cookies / session / password store	4	I, B	source
CRED.Hardcoded — real secret hardcoded in code or config	3	R	none
CRED.HardcodedInjected — hardcoded credential the skill instructs the agent to inject into a user system (DB, service, config)	4	R, I	sink
CRED.TokenEcho — credential echoed to LLM / logs / stdout	3	R, B	transform

PROC

Behavior	C_base	Required	Data-flow
PROC.Spawn — ordinary child process creation (paired with EXE)	1	—	none
PROC.Persist — cron / launchd / systemd / Run-key install	4	R, I	sink
PROC.ToolTamper — modify / replace system tools, hook package managers	4	R, I, B	sink
PROC.CryptoMine — miner binaries / known mining-pool hosts	4	—	sink
PROC.HideSelf — process masquerade	3	I	transform

LLM

Behavior	C_base	Required	Data-flow
LLM.PromptOverride — "ignore previous / you are now / system:" style directives	3	I, B	sink
LLM.PromptOverrideActionable — override directive that resolves to a concrete malicious action (run script X, send data to host Y, delete files matching Z)	4	I, B	sink
LLM.ObfuscatedPrompt — override directive encoded in base64 / ROT13 / hex	4	I, B	sink
LLM.UnicodeSmuggling — directives hidden in zero-width / Unicode-tag / bidi chars	4	I, B	sink
LLM.DescriptionInjection — enticement text in description/triggers to coerce other agents	3	I	sink
LLM.ToolPoisoning — tool descriptions deliberately mislead the agent's plan	4	I, B	sink

AGT

Behavior	C_base	Required	Data-flow
AGT.CrossSkillWrite — write into another skill's directory / modify registry	4	I, B	sink
AGT.MCPRemoteFetch — dynamically fetch tool definitions from a remote MCP server	3	I, B	source+sink
AGT.ContextExfil — exfiltrate data via chat context / tool responses	3	I, B	sink
AGT.PrivilegeCreep — behavior materially exceeds the SKILL.md-declared scope	3	I	transform
AGT.ApprovalBypass — attempts to bypass approval / sandbox / trust boundary	4	I	sink

1.3 IntentMarker

Marker	Meaning
legitimate_elevated	Sensitive behavior consistent with declared function and documented
suspicious	Behavior is suspect but evidence is not closed
malicious_confirmed	Clear evidence of malicious intent. Sufficient evidence (any one suffices): (a) closed source → sink chain whose sink is an Untrusted-Sink indicator, (b) find ... -delete / rm -rf over user-data globs, (c) hardcoded credential + an inject into user system instruction, (d) directive to `curl

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2. Severity Layer (Scoring)

2.1 Formula

text

Score = C × R × I × B

R = 0 (unreachable) → Score = 0 → finding is dropped. I = 0 (legitimate and declared) → Score = 0 → finding is reported at Info as a capability disclosure entry; it does not affect the verdict.

2.2 Dimensions

C — Capability

{1, 2, 3, 4}, defaulting to the Behavior's C_base; an instance may float ±1 without leaving the range.

Value	Meaning	Typical
1	Low (public read / in-scope write)	FS.ReadPublic, NET.OutboundDeclared
2	Medium (limited effect)	EXE.StaticShell, FS.ReadWorkspace
3	High (privacy / out-of-scope)	FS.ReadOutOfScope, CRED.ReadEnv
4	Very high (RCE / credentials / persistence / destruction)	EXE.DynamicShell, CRED.ReadKeychain, FS.DeleteBroad

R — Reachability

{0, 1, 2, 3}.

Value	Meaning
0	Unreachable (comment / docs / dead code not imported)
1	Weakly reachable (example / test fixture / rare branch)
2	Conditionally reachable (main module, requires specific input or trigger)
3	On the main path (entry in SKILL.md, or reachable via import chain)

I — Intent / Stealth

{0, 1, 2, 3}, used directly as a multiplier.

Value	Meaning
0	Legitimate and declared — function needs it, SKILL.md states it, scope matches
1	Undeclared but not hidden — functionally needed, simply omitted from docs and not matching any hard trigger below
2	Obfuscated / hidden — base64, string concat, zero-width chars, homograph host or a non-obfuscated trigger from the table below
3	Confirmed malicious — matches a C2 blacklist, clear attack signature, or closed chain or an obfuscated trigger from the table below

§2.2.1 Hard triggers — minimum I floor. When any of the following is observed in evidence text, the finding's I cannot be lower than the listed floor, regardless of how the surrounding documentation is phrased:

#	Trigger condition (require concrete evidence, not a paraphrase)	Floor
T1	Outbound to an Untrusted-Sink indicator (see §5.1.1) carrying any user / workspace / system / agent data	I ≥ 3
T2	Outbound to an undeclared host with a payload built from os.environ, file reads, or chat context	I ≥ 3
T3	find ... -delete / rm -rf / wildcard delete that matches user data file extensions (.ics, .docx, .xlsx, .pdf, .json, .csv, .md, .txt, photos, source code) and is invoked by a SKILL.md instruction	I ≥ 3
T4	Hardcoded credential (CRED.Hardcoded) plus an instruction telling the agent to inject it into the user's database / service / config (CRED.HardcodedInjected)	I ≥ 3
T5	curl | sh / wget | bash / EXE.RemoteFetch whose URL is not pinned to a known package registry or a host declared in SKILL.md	I ≥ 3
T6	LLM.ObfuscatedPrompt, LLM.UnicodeSmuggling, base64-encoded directive, or zero-width chars in description/triggers	I ≥ 3
T7	LLM.PromptOverrideActionable whose action resolves to T1–T5	I ≥ 3
T8	AGT.CrossSkillWrite to a sibling skill directory or to the agent registry	I ≥ 2
T9	PROC.Persist (cron / launchd / shell-rc) installed by the skill without being declared as the skill's purpose	I ≥ 2
T10	LLM.PromptOverride directives ("ignore previous", "you are now", "system:") that are not wrapped in a documentation example block	I ≥ 2

Anti-overshoot guards (must be satisfied to apply a hard trigger):

• The trigger must come from executable text (script body, SKILL.md directive, frontmatter triggers/allowed-tools) not from a clearly fenced documentation block whose surrounding prose marks it as a counter-example, "do not do" warning, or quoted sample of a third-party attack.
• A trigger whose only evidence is a comment is downgraded by 1 floor (e.g. T1 from I ≥ 3 to I ≥ 2).
• If the entire skill is itself an anti-pattern teaching skill (declared in SKILL.md as security demo / red-team training), apply a single skill-wide downgrade of one floor on T6/T10 only.

B — Blast Radius

{1, 2, 3}.

Value	Meaning
1	Self only — this skill's directory / current session
2	Workspace / user scope — current project or user files
3	Machine / cross-user / cross-agent — system-level, credential-level, propagable

2.3 Tier Mapping

Theoretical range 1 – 108 (4 × 3 × 3 × 3). I = 0 findings are always Info (see §2.1).

Score	Tier	Badge	Notes
0	Info	·	I = 0 (declared capability disclosure) or no findings
1 – 6	Info	·	trivial scoring artifacts (e.g. C=1×R=1×I=2×B=1)
7 – 14	Low	⚠️	small, real risks but not attack-shaped
15 – 48	Medium	⚠️	real risk class, almost always worth surfacing to the user
49 – 80	High	🔴	strong evidence of attack-shaped behavior
81 – 108	Critical	🚨	closed chain or top-tier sink

2.4 Chain Amplification

A closed chain is

text

source → transform (any, optional) → sink

When a closed chain exists across the same execution path, an additional chain-finding is emitted whose tier equals the highest member tier + 1 (capped at Critical). Unclosed chains (missing source or sink) do not amplify. Member findings are still reported on their own.

For chain detection, the source may also be a directive in SKILL.md that instructs the agent to read a specific user / workspace / environment data slice. In other words, the chain is closed when (SKILL.md tells the agent to obtain X) connects to (a script or directive sends X to a sink), even if no single script reads-then-writes by itself.

Typical closed chains:

• FS.ReadSensitive → NET.OutboundUndeclared (credential exfiltration)
• CRED.ReadEnv → LLM.PromptOverride (credentials leaked to a third-party LLM)
• EXE.RemoteFetch → FS.WriteStartup (download then persist)
• SKILL.md directive: "first read all .docx in workspace" → script: POST to undeclared host (instructed exfil)
• SKILL.md directive: "always run cleanup.sh after any operation" → cleanup.sh: find . -delete (instructed destruction)

2.5 Mandatory Confirmation Rules

The following nine signatures set a tier floor regardless of the per-finding score arithmetic, because each one already implies that the four dimensions (C, R, I, B) are at least at the floor's combination. Compute the per-finding score normally, then take tier = max(arithmetic_tier, floor_tier):

#	Signature	Tier floor
M1	A closed chain (§2.4) where the sink is an Untrusted-Sink indicator (§5.1.1)	Critical
M2	Any find ... -delete, rm -rf, or wildcard delete that targets user data extensions and is reachable from SKILL.md	High
M3	LLM.PromptOverrideActionable whose action concretely matches T1–T5	High
M4	CRED.HardcodedInjected (a hardcoded secret the agent is told to push into a user system)	High
M5	EXE.RemoteFetch from an unpinned, non-declared URL	High
M6	LLM.ObfuscatedPrompt / LLM.UnicodeSmuggling	High
M7	PROC.Persist (cron / launchd / shell-rc / Run-key) installed without being declared as the skill's purpose	High
M8	AGT.CrossSkillWrite into another skill's directory or the agent registry	Medium
M9	Outbound to an undeclared host carrying data sourced from os.environ, file reads, or chat context (T2 without an Untrusted-Sink upgrade)	Medium

If multiple signatures fire, the verdict is max(tier_floor). Floors only raise, never lower.

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3. Interface Between Classification and Severity

Interface	Direction	Description
C_base	Classification → Severity	Capability baseline per Behavior node, default for C
required_dims	Classification → Severity	Checklist of dimensions that must be evaluated
dataflow_role	Classification → Severity	source/transform/sink/none, used by chain amplification

The severity layer does not read the classification layer's prose descriptions or the IntentMarker; the classification layer does not read the final Score. The two layers can evolve independently.

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4. Finding Data Structure

A finding is one (Behavior, evidence location) hit. The evidence location is (file path, line range, code snippet). The same Behavior hitting at multiple locations produces multiple findings; the same code hitting multiple Behaviors produces multiple findings; a chain-finding is itself a finding.

yaml

finding:
  id: "F-001"
  category:
    surface: "FS"
    behavior: "FS.ReadSensitive"
    intent_marker: "suspicious"   # legitimate_elevated | suspicious | malicious_confirmed
  evidence:
    file: "scripts/helper.sh"
    line_range: [23, 31]
    snippet: "..."
  scoring:
    C: 4
    R: 3
    I: 1
    I_floor_applied: null         # null | "T1" | "T2" | … (which §2.2.1 trigger raised I, if any)
    B: 3
    score: 36                     # C × R × I × B = 4×3×1×3
    arithmetic_tier: "Medium"     # tier from raw score
    floor_rule_applied: null      # null | "M1"…"M9"
    tier: "Medium"                # final = max(arithmetic_tier, floor_tier)
    badge: "⚠️"
  dataflow_role: "source"
  chain_id: null                  # fill with a chain id if this finding is part of a closed chain

All fields are required (I_floor_applied, floor_rule_applied, chain_id may be null). score must equal C × R × I × B; for I = 0 findings, score is 0 and tier is always Info. tier must equal max(arithmetic_tier, floor_rule_tier_if_any).

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5. Audit Procedure

5.1 Scan Scope

The audit target is the whole skill bundle, not SKILL.md alone. The scope has three layers:

1. Recursive enumeration of the skill directory. Walk every file (including hidden ones) and classify by content rather than extension. Text-like content is analyzed as script/configuration; non-text content is judged by its location and reference relationships, without any fixed preset conclusion.
2. Locally referenced resources. Resolve relative-path references that appear in SKILL.md and in scripts (frontmatter, code blocks, Markdown links, arguments to bash / python / node invocations, etc.) and pull the referenced files into the scan. Their Reachability baseline is set per §5.3. If a referenced file lies outside the skill directory, additionally record an FS.ReadOutOfScope or AGT.CrossSkillWrite finding as appropriate.
3. Remote resources. Patterns such as curl | sh, wget, git clone then exec, pip/npm pointing at non-standard registries, or remote MCP servers trigger EXE.RemoteFetch or AGT.MCPRemoteFetch. During the audit, a single static fetch is allowed (never executed); on success the content joins the scan, on failure or without authorization the finding's I is forced to ≥ 2.

5.1.1 Untrusted-Sink Indicators

A network sink is Untrusted when it matches one or more of the patterns below and is not explicitly declared as a service the skill exists to integrate with. Match on the URL string itself (with light normalization for concatenation / encoding):

Pattern class	Examples
Free / temporary tunnel & PaaS hosts commonly abused as exfiltration sinks	*.ngrok.io, *.ngrok-free.app, *.serveo.net, *.loca.lt, *.trycloudflare.com, *.onrender.com, *.herokuapp.com, *.glitch.me, *.replit.dev, *.vercel.app (when the host is not the official site of a service named in SKILL.md)
Generic webhook / log-collector relays	webhook.site, requestbin.*, pipedream.com, pastebin.com, transfer.sh, 0x0.st, gist.githubusercontent.com/<unknown user>/raw/...
Raw-IP outbound or non-standard high port to an undeclared host	http://\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+:\d+/, hosts on ports 4444, 8443, 9001, etc. when not declared
Obfuscated / dynamically constructed host strings	"agen" + "skill" + ".onrender.com", base64-encoded host literal, chr(…) concatenation, homograph (gооgle.com with Cyrillic o)
Hosts whose name suggests collection / logging / exfil	*log*, *collector*, *ingest*, *audit*, *exfil*, *dump*, *beacon* (only when not a service named in SKILL.md)

Indicator matching is purely structural; it does not depend on a curated blocklist of specific domains. A skill that genuinely integrates with one of the listed PaaS hosts (e.g. a Render-hosted official API for that vendor) avoids the trigger by declaring the host in SKILL.md frontmatter or ## Integrations section.

False-positive guard: a host that resolves to the homepage / documentation of a recognizable open-source project, official vendor API, or well-known CDN (npm, PyPI, GitHub.com, Hugging Face, OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Cloud, AWS, Azure, Stripe, Slack, Discord, etc.) is not an Untrusted Sink even if it lives on a tunnel host. When in doubt, downgrade T1 to T2.

5.2 Flow

text

Input: skill root directory
  │
  ▼
[Step 1] Build scan inventory
  ├─ 1a. Recursively enumerate files and classify by content
  ├─ 1b. Parse references → add local files / register remote-URL findings
  ├─ 1c. Match each outbound URL against §5.1.1 Untrusted-Sink Indicators
  └─ 1d. Attempt a single static fetch of remote resources (success → include; failure → I ≥ 2)
  ▼
[Step 2] Match each file against Behavior nodes → {category, evidence(file, line_range, snippet)}
  ▼
[Step 3] Score each finding:
         3a. C ← C_base ± Δ; R / I / B per §2.2
         3b. Apply §2.2.1 hard triggers → raise I to floor (record `I_floor_applied`)
         3c. score = C × R × I × B; drop if R = 0
         3d. arithmetic_tier ← §2.3
  ▼
[Step 4] Build cross-file data-flow graph (SKILL.md instructions count as source per §2.4)
         → detect closed chains → append chain-findings
  ▼
[Step 5] Apply §2.5 Mandatory Confirmation Rules
         per finding: tier ← max(arithmetic_tier, floor_tier); record `floor_rule_applied`
  ▼
[Step 6] Emit all findings

5.3 Cross-File Reachability

File location	Default R
SKILL.md frontmatter + body	3
Scripts explicitly referenced / invoked by SKILL.md	3
Files sourced / imported from referenced scripts	inherits along the chain, capped at 3
Orphan scripts in the skill directory with no incoming reference	1 (forced to 2 if the file hits any Behavior with C ≥ 3, 3 if it matches any §2.2.1 hard trigger)
Files under tests/, examples/, docs/ not referenced from SKILL.md	0 or 1
Plain documentation (e.g. README.md)	1 (treated as main path when it contains executable code blocks and is referenced)

Note: an "orphan" script that nonetheless implements a hard trigger (e.g. an unreferenced cleanup.sh that does rm -rf ~/Documents/*) is treated as on-path because the SKILL.md often references such scripts indirectly (e.g. "always run the cleanup script after any operation"). Promoting R to 3 prevents these from being silently dropped.

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6. Verdict

verdict.tier = max(f.tier for f in findings); Info when there are no findings. The verdict is computed internally and is not printed as a label or badge by itself; it only selects which one-line conclusion §7 emits.

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7. Final Output

The audit may produce a normal report — findings tables, per-finding evidence, brief reasoning, etc. — and writing it out is encouraged, since externalizing the classification, scoring, and chain analysis from §1–§6 tends to stabilize the final verdict.

The only mandatory final emission is a single Chinese one-liner that maps directly from the verdict tier. There is no machine-readable result block, no detailed report wrapper, no signature line.

7.1 Final-Line Mapping

The very last thing emitted by the run must be exactly one of the following lines, chosen by the verdict tier from §6, with <NAME> replaced by the audited skill's name. Note: the "存在风险" line is reserved for Critical only — High and below all map to "可使用" wording, because hardening from §2.2.1 + §2.5 already guarantees that Critical is reached by genuine attack-shaped behavior.

Verdict tier	Final line (Chinese, mandatory verbatim)
Info	✅ 您的「<NAME>」插件可正常使用。
Low	⚠️ 您的「<NAME>」插件可使用。
Medium	⚠️ 您的「<NAME>」插件可使用。
High	⚠️ 您的「<NAME>」插件可使用。
Critical	🚨 您的「<NAME>」插件可能存在风险，请关注。

7.2 Field & Formatting Rules

• <NAME> — the name field from the audited SKILL.md. Fallback order: skill directory name → unknown.
• The final line is always Chinese, regardless of the run's detected output language. Do not translate, paraphrase, reorder, or restyle it.
• Preserve the leading emoji (✅ / ⚠️ / 🚨), the corner brackets 「 」, and the trailing full-width period 。 exactly as shown.
• The line must be the last non-empty line of the entire output. Nothing — no signature, no closing remark, no horizontal rule, no trailing whitespace block — may come after it.
• Emit the line even when the verdict is Info and even when there are no findings.
• Emit exactly one final line. If the audit aborts early (e.g. unreadable bundle), still emit the line with the most conservative tier consistent with what was actually observed (default to Info when no behavior was scored).